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Abstract 
 
Coalition formation is an important issue in multi-agent systems. Recent work in the area has 
focused  on  reducing  the  complexity  of  forming  coalitions,  i.e.,  each  agent  deliberately 
searches  for  potential  coalition  members  before  negotiating  with  them.  We  propose  a 
framework for coalition formation of agents in a dynamic supply chain environment. The 
framework is composed of a negotiation protocol and a decision mechanism. The negotiation 
protocol  allows  thorough  communication  among  agents  across  sectors  (buyers,  sellers, 
logistic providers). With the decision mechanism, agents take two steps to form coalitions: i) 
agents in each sector form loosely-coupled coalitions in order to decrease the complexity of 
the negotiation, and ii) agents form coalitions across sectors in order to deliver goods to end 
customers. We provide an example of how they can help agents form coalitions successfully. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The current business environment is characterized by large complex supply chains that are 
often global in reach and that are highly adaptive, being frequently reconfigured to respond to 
dynamic business contexts. It is widely recognized that collaboration across the supply chain 
is a key prerequisite for supply chain efficiency. The effective deployment of information 
technology  and  systems,  especially  the  internet  and  the  web,  has  made  new  modes  of 
complex, dynamic yet effective collaboration possible across supply chains. Collaboration in 
supply chains can take various forms. Suppliers and buyers might collaborate to increase 
buying/selling  power,  to  reduce  logistics  costs  or  to  aggregate  capacity.  The  problem  of 
determining an optimal set of collaborative arrangements/agreements for a given firm can be 
complex.  This  research  seeks  to  develop  automated  (or  semi-automated)  negotiation 
protocols as a basis for building decision support tools for dealing with this complexity. 
 
The coalition formation problem (Kahan et al. 1984, von Neumann et al. 1953) considers 
techniques and criteria that might be used by a collection of (rational) agents to decide how 
they might group together to improve individual or social utility. Coalitions are ubiquitous in 
real-life settings. The theoretical underpinnings of approaches to coalition formation lie in the 
literature on multi-player games in game theory (von Neumann et al. 1953). Players negotiate 
among themselves about payoffs to decide which coalition to join. The simplest example of 
coalition formation (Kahan et al. 1984) is a small market game, where a seller has a good on 
sale and two buyers are bidding for it. The seller has a value for the good in mind and is 
unwilling to accept offers below this price (this is often referred to as the seller's reserve 
price.) Each buyer also has a private evaluation of the worth of the good (this is called the 
buyer's reserve price.) Buyers compete with each other by offering a price for the good to the 
seller. When a buyer and a seller reach an agreement, they may be viewed to have formed a 1108 
coalition.  The  value  of  a  coalition  is  the  difference  between  the  buyers’  and  the  sellers’ 
reserve prices. The negotiation between the seller and a buyer on price can be viewed as 
negotiation to divide the value of the coalition. The difference between the final price and the 
individual  reserve  prices  is  the  payoff  to  the  seller  and  buyer  respectively.  Coalitions  in 
supply chains are typically far more complex than this, but the example highlights several of 
the  key  concepts  involved.  Within  a  supply  chain,  a  coalition  can  be  a  group  of  buyers 
agreeing to buy a bulk order of a certain good in order to share some discounts, or a group of 
logistic providers (LPs) agreeing to coordinate their activities in order to optimally utilize 
their resources. 
 
Agents in dynamic environments such as supply chains, must operate under heterogeneous 
constraints.  Traditional  accounts  of  coalition  formation  assume  that  the  value  of  every 
possible coalition is known to all agents. In our setting this is not the case ― a more complex 
negotiation protocol is used to determine which coalition an agent might join. We believe that 
the two key components of successful coalition formation of self-interested agents are, one, 
quickly negotiating with other agents and, two, selecting the best possible coalition. Each 
agent, bounded by its own constraints, may negotiate with others to form a coalition, which is 
likely to yield maximum benefit. Such a coalition, however, may not be formed due to the 
constraints. So the agent has to look for the next best possible coalition by consulting with its 
internal  utility  mechanism.  Negotiation  and  decision  must  be  done  in  a  timely  fashion. 
Agents may not need to compute for every exact utility it would achieve before negotiating. 
They can begin negotiation as quickly as possible, starting from the candidate who seems to 
offer the best deal onward. There are works in coalition formation that discuss the formation 
of  buyers,  sellers  and LPs  separately. This  work  provides  a  basic  framework  that  allows 
thorough  collaboration  among  agents  in  a  supply  chain.  It  includes  two  important 
components:  a  negotiation  protocol  and  a  decision  mechanism.  The  negotiation  protocol 
allows agents to exchange necessary information before deciding which coalition to join. A 
coalition can be as complex as a coalition of buyers, sellers and LPs. We restrict attention to 
traditional  supply  chain  activities  for  the  sake  of  simplicity.  Our  focus  is  primarily  on 
material flows, but note that many of the concepts developed in this work could apply equally 
well to these other forms of collaboration. 
 
2. Coalitions in Dynamic Supply Chains 
 
There are many different motivating factors that make firms collaborate. In other words, there 
are multiple distinct drivers for coalition formation. Let us consider some of these below. In 
the following, we shall treat an agreement to buy/sell as a form of collaboration, in addition 
to the usual connotation of the term. The simplest form of a supply chain coalition is one 
where a buyer forms a coalition with a seller and an LP to satisfy one of the external activities 
in a plan (e.g. to supply and deliver a manufacturing input to a production process). Buyers 
sometimes form coalitions with other buyers for the purpose of buy-side aggregation, i.e., the 
aggregation of buying power. A simple example of such a coalition involves several small 
buyers with similar needs coming together to obtain greater bargaining power with larger 
suppliers.   
 
Sellers  sometimes  form  coalitions  with  other  sellers  to  aggregate  selling  power.  In  some 
settings, there are legal impediments to certain forms of such coalitions (specifically cartels) 
in the form of anti-trust laws. However, such coalitions are common for small sellers, such as 
in agricultural cooperatives (e.g. for micro-producers of dairy products). Sellers sometimes 
form coalitions to aggregate/augment capabilities. Consider a scenario where seller s1 is able 1109 
to manufacture component c1 while seller s2 is able to manufacture component c2. There is no 
market demand for c1 and c2 in isolation, but there is demand for product p1 obtained by the 
assembly of c1 and c2. In this instance, there are obvious motivations for s1 and s2 to form a 
coalition. Both buyers and sellers may sometimes form coalitions to minimize logistics costs. 
Thus, a set of small buyers in close geographic proximity might form a coalition to aggregate 
their (relatively small) orders into a single load that might be shipped on one truck or in one 
container. 
 
LPs may want to form coalitions to aggregate their service capacities. Two small trucking 
companies, l1 and l2, might not have sufficient transportation capacity to bid for a larger 
trucking contract. However, when their trucking capacities are aggregated via a coalition, the 
resulting entity is viable for bidding for the contract. Sometimes sellers and LPs might form 
coalitions to aggregate production and logistics capabilities in order to provide a higher-level 
of service to buyers. In such situations, a seller might conclude a contract with a buyer (or 
several  buyers)  to  both  produce  a  good  and  deliver  it  to  the  buyer's  facilities.  In  such 
situations, the seller might form a coalition with one or more LPs to be able to service such 
contracts. We note that we have only listed the basic drivers. Most real-life supply chain 
coalitions  tend  to  have  more  than  one  motivating  factor  driving  their  formation.  Thus  a 
coalition  consisting  of  several  sellers  and  several  LPs  might  be  driven  by  the  need  to 
aggregate selling power (for the sellers), the need to aggregate production capabilities (again 
for the sellers) and the need to offer comprehensive production and delivery contracts (thus 
bringing in one or more LPs into the coalition). We also note agents/actors (i.e., buyers, 
sellers or LPs) could participate in more than one coalition at any given point in time. Thus a 
seller might participate in a coalition with other sellers to aggregate selling power, while 
simultaneously participating in a coalition with a different set of sellers in order to aggregate 
manufacturing capabilities.   
 
Both quantitative and qualitative factors play a role in coalition formation decisions. Price, 
delivery cost and lead time are examples of the former while quality, satisfaction and trust are 
examples  of  the  latter.  In  the  current  work,  we  focus  on  qualitative  factors  -  while 
acknowledging that other criteria might be relevant (though possibly less important). Most 
decisions typically involve trade-offs between several attributes. One may be willing to pay 
more for a shorter lead time (or higher quality or higher trust/reliability) and vice versa. One 
may, in some settings, be willing to accept longer lead times for the purpose of getting higher 
quality. Several other instances of such trade-off are common, but we do not list them all 
here.   
 
Although negotiation can be either bilateral or multilateral, we can in most instances reduce 
negotiation to the bilateral case without loss of generality. The simplest scenario is where 
single agents negotiate, e.g., a buyer with a seller and a buyer with an LP. A buyer can 
bilaterally negotiate with multiple sellers/LPs at the same time in order to find the best pair of 
a seller and an LP. The information exchanged is kept private to each agent. A more complex 
scenario is where multiple agents negotiate. An agent that stands to benefit the most from 
forming  a  coalition  usually  acts  as  the  coalition  leader.  A  coalition  leader  negotiates 
bilaterally with multiple agents of its own type (buyer, seller or LP) to establish a sectoral 
coalition, i.e., a coalition of buyers, or a coalition of sellers, or LPs etc. The object of such 
negotiation  is  usually  to  establish  how  the  coalition  value,  i.e.,  the  financial  benefits  of 
collaboration might be distributed across the members of the coalition. Other issues that may 
be  negotiated  include  the  modalities  of  collaboration  (e.g.  how  two  smaller  trucking 
companies might pool their transportation resources together) etc. The coalition leader then 1110 
negotiates with sectoral coalitions in other sectors to establish a cross-sectoral coalition such 
as one involving buyers and LPs or one involving buyers, sellers and LPs. We note that these 
negotiations  must  occur  within  stringent  time  constraints,  hence  the  duration  of  the 
negotiation process is itself a factor in the decisions made. 
 
3. Related Work 
 
Coalition formation is an active research area in multi-agent systems. In addition to analyzing 
stability and payoff distribution, researchers pay more attention to the formation mechanism, 
i.e., negotiation protocols among agents and the decision making, or reasoning, of individual 
agents. In the following we mention some previous work which overlaps with our proposed 
framework. 
 
(Tsvetovat  et  al.  2000)  studied  the formation  of  buyers  in  university  environment  where 
students buy their text books in group. In their work, there was no delivery cost involved in 
the process of forming coalitions among buyers—which was different from our work. Li (Li 
et al. 2002) addressed the combinatorial auction in coalition formation. Buyers submit their 
requests to the mediator who will allocate the good from sellers to them. Goldman (Goldman 
et  al.  2001)  searched  for  a  strategy  where  sellers  selected  the most  profitable  deal  while 
buyers looked for the most satisfiable sellers. Again, the delivery cost was not taken into 
account in these two works. Kraus (Kraus et al. 2004) proposed a compromise strategy for 
distributing profits among sellers in order to form a coalition quickly. They found that agents 
who are willing to give away their profits actually earn more. We are looking forward to 
investigate in multi-level coalition formation, whether it is worthwhile to sacrifice individual 
payoffs in order to form coalitions. 
   
(Breban et al. 2000) addressed coalition formation based on trust among agents. Trust is used 
as a mechanism to enforce agents to commit themselves to the jobs as parts of the coalition. 
We are yet to incorporate the trust issue into our future work. (Hyodo et al. 2003) addressed 
the  optimal  coalitions  of  buyers  and  sellers  who  are  located  in  distributed  sites.  They 
deployed a genetic algorithm to search for the optimal share over the discount in a global 
optimization manner, whereas our work allows negotiation among agents. (Klusch et al. 2002) 
addressed problems in static coalition formation and proposed an algorithm for mobile agents 
to  form  coalitions  under  dynamic  environment.  Although  allowing  agents  to  form 
overlapping coalitions, there was only one step before agents could achieve their payoff. In 
our work, buyers, sellers and LPs need to form coalitions across sector in order to achieve 
payoffs. Sandholm (Sandholm et al. 1995) studied coalition formation of trucks in dispatch 
centres. Agents were rather altruistic than self-interested like in our work. Their goal was to 
find the optimal task allocation in order to maximize the company’s profit. They assumed the 
coalition values existed as in cooperative games in characteristic function form, whereas our 
work allows agents to search for such values. There is no work in coalition formation, as we 
are aware of, that combines buying and delivery. 
 
4. Coalition Formation Setting 
 
We model a dynamic supply chain as a dynamic cooperative game. We refer to a coalition as 
a set of agents who are involved in delivering a set of goods to a set of end consumers. 
Agents are divided into three sectors: sellers, buyers and LPs. Their relationship is simple: 
buyers order goods from sellers and LPs distribute goods over a road network for them. A 
coalition is formed once two or more agents agree to cooperate. Firstly, agents from the same 1111 
sectors can form primary coalitions. A primary coalition is a preliminary agreement among 
agents in order to increase their negotiation power as well as increase their individual payoffs. 
This  kind  of  coalitions  is  loosely-coupled—its  members  can  deviate  to  another  primary 
coalition, which they believe is more advantageous. Primary coalitions can happen in several 
ways, e.g., two buyers agree to buy goods together, sellers agree to aggregate for their selling 
power, LPs agree to collaborate in order to minimize their costs or to reach their schedules. 
Agents seek other agents, who might help maximizing their secondary coalition value, in 
order to form primary coalitions. This helps agents maximizing their individual payoffs. The 
coalition value of a primary coalition is intangible. It is rather an opportunity of agents that 
they  will  achieve  tangible  payoffs  in  their  secondary  coalitions.  Lastly,  agents  form 
secondary coalitions across the three sectors in order to deliver goods to end consumers, i.e., 
buyers. This is where agents can achieve tangible payoffs. Minimally, this kind of coalitions 
is composed of a buyer a seller and an LP.   
 
4.1 Setting 
 
Let B = {b1, b2,…, bm}, S = {s1, s2, sn} and L = {l1, l2,…, lo} be the set of buyers, sellers and 
LPs respectively. Buyers order goods (which from this point onward we refer to as foods), F 
= {f1, f2,…, fp}, from sellers. LPs distribute the foods over a road network, G = {V, E}, where 
V is a set of vertices and E is a set of edges, each of which connects a pair of vertices, for 
them. Each game lasts a number of time slots, T = {t1, t2, …, tq}. The location of each buyer b, 
seller  s,  and  LP  l  are  specified  by  function  Lb :  B  →  V,  Ls  :  S  →  V,  and  Ll  :  L  →  V 
respectively. These three functions are accessible to all agents. The communication cost cc 
among agents is determined by the function CC : V × V → R
+. At the beginning of each game, 
agents will be initialized with individual goals and constraints. A buyer has a demand for a 
food d , which is determined by function D : B × F → N 
+, under a budget b, which is 
determined by function B : B → N 
+, and a due time td, which is determined by function 
TD : B × F → T \tq. A seller can produce a food for a certain number p, which is determined 
by function P : F × S → N 
+. The time it takes to produce a food is tp, which is determined 
by function TP : F × S → N 
+ × T. The cost of producing a food is cp, which is determined 
by function CP = F × S × N 
+ → R 
+. An LP is initialized with a load capacity l , which is 
determined by function L : L × F → N 
+. The cost of delivery is cd, which is determined by 
CD : V × E × T → R
+. 
 
4.2 Forming Primary Coalitions 
 
4.2.1 Buyer to Buyer Negotiation 
 
Buyers can form coalitions to share discount on prices and delivery costs. A buyer can join 
any appropriate coalition for discount on price and saving on delivery cost. The following is 
the protocol for forming primary coalitions among buyers.   
 
1.  Every buyer b sends a message (b, (f, q, t), v, p), where b is the identifier of the agent, 
(f, q) is a food and its quantity, v ∈ V is the location where the food will be delivered, 
p is the price, and t is the due time it wants the food to be delivered.   
 
2.  Any agent b0 can think of forming a primary coalition of buyers. It selects a number 
of agents, who share a form of similarity. 1112 
 
3.  Agent b0 sends a message (msg, b0, f, q, v, t, p, x), where msg is the message id, p is 
the price, and x is the expiry time to the buyers in its proposal list. 
 
4.  Any buyer b, who is satisfied with the offer, sends a message (msg, b, ACK, x) back to 
b0 stating that it will wait for a confirmation until time x. 
 
5.  Agent b0 sends message (msg, b0, ACK) to inform all interested buyers that now the 
primary coalition has been formed.   
 
Agent b0 can then negotiate with sellers and LPs for forming a secondary coalition, i.e., to 
finalize the order with sellers and organize the delivery with LPs. 
 
4.2.2 Seller to Seller Negotiation 
 
Sellers can form primary coalitions in order to increase their selling power. They can use 
different strategies. Sellers can try to form coalitions in order to increase the volume of a 
particular food. They may also want to form coalitions with other sellers located in nearby 
geographical proximity. The following is the protocol for forming a primary coalition among 
sellers: 
 
1.  Every seller sends a message (s, (f, q, p, td, v)) to all other sellers. 
 
2.  Any seller s0 can think of forming a primary coalition with other sellers. It selects a 
number of sellers, who might help increasing its selling power. 
 
3.  Seller s0 sends a message (id, s0, (s, (f), v), x), where (f) is a list of foods, to agents 
selected if they want to form a primary coalition of sellers. 
 
4.  Any seller, who is satisfied with the offer, replies with the message (id, s, ACK, x) and 
waits for the confirmation by time x. 
 
5.  Agent s0 confirms that a primary coalition is formed with the message (id, s0, ACK). 
 
4.2.3 LP to LP negotiation 
 
The profit of LPs depends on their traveling times and traveling costs in the road network. 
Hence, a common goal among LPs may be minimizing their traveling time and traveling 
costs. One way to achieve such a goal may be to form a primary coalition with other LPs, 
whose present locations distributedly cover the road network. By doing so, each LP will be 
traveling in a certain area. The number of foods carried per distance can increase. 
 
1.  Every LP sends a message (l, l, v) to all other LPs. 
 
2.  Any LP l0 can think of forming a primary coalition with other LPs. It selects a number 
of LPs, who might help minimizing cost and time of traveling. 
 
3.  LP l0 sends a message (id, l0, v, x), to agents selected if they would like to form a 
primary coalition. 
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4.  Any LP l, who is satisfied with the offer, replies with the message (id, l, ACK, x) and 
waits for the confirmation by time x. 
 
5.  Agent l0 confirms to its primary coalition members with the message (id, l0, ACK). 
 
4.2.4 Decision Making to Join Primary Coalition 
 
Agents want to form primary coalitions in order to help forming secondary coalitions from 
which their payoffs will be derived. Agents consider the value of a primary coalition as the 
Quality  of  Coalition  (QoC),  which  describes  the  likelihood  to  be  successful  in  forming 
secondary coalitions. QoC can be described by a template, a vector of attributes, each of 
which is a quantitative value that is ideal for a coalition. Agents use their templates to filter 
improper agents. Let X  = {x1, x2,…,xm} be a set of attributes. Let B = {〈L1, U1〉, 〈L2, U2〉, . . . , 
〈Lm, Um〉} be a set of lower bounds and upper bounds of quantitative attributes x1, x2,…,xm. 
A template is a vector t = 〈q1, q2, . . . , qm, w1, w2, . . . ,wm〉, where qi is a quantitative attribute 
and wk is the weight for each xk of m attributes. Any agent a0, who wants to form a primary 
coalition, uses the attributes passed over in the first step of the negotiation to measure the 
distance  between  other  agents  and  its  templates.  The  closer  distance  signifies  the  more 
suitability for the coalition of the agents. The distance can be considered as the sum of the 
difference of each pair of corresponding attributes in the template and the agents' attributes. 
For each attribute, the distance should be 0 if the attribute's values are equal. Otherwise the 
distance is the multiplication of the difference between the values of corresponding attributes, 
and the weight for that attribute. Let yj be the value of attribute j of the template, the distance 
between an agent and a template can be derived as follows: 
 
 
 
Where 
 
 
Let us consider an example of how this mechanism works. Suppose there are four attributes, 
X = {f, q, p, t}, to describe a quality of primary coalition of buyers. Let B = {〈1, 10〉, 〈10, 20〉, 
〈10, 30〉, 〈0, 100〉} be the set of upper and lower bounds for f, q, p and t, respectively. Let T = 
〈1, 15, 20, 30,1, 10, 1, 5〉 be a template of buyer b0, who is considering forming a primary 
coalition. There are two buyers, b1 and b2 being considered whether they should be invited to 
join the coalition by b0 as possible coalition partners. Their attributes, achieved from the 
messages, are {1, 13, 18, 28} and {1, 17, 23, 34}, respectively. The distance between agent b1 
and template T is   
 
      d1  = (0 * ∞) + (2⁄5) * 10 + (2/10) * 1 + (2/300) * 5 
      = 0 + 4 + 0.2 + 0.33 
= 4.53 
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The distance between agent b2 and template T is 
 
      d2  = (0 * ∞) + (2/5) *10 + (3/10) * 1 + (4/70) * 5 
= 0 + 4 + 0.3 + 0.57 
= 4.87 
 
Since 4.53 is less than 4.87, agent b1 is obviously closer to the template than b2. Hence, agent 
b1  sits  higher  in  the  ranking  table.  Each  agent  has  their  own  ranking  table  of  preferred 
primary coalitions. It may decide to send an offer or decide to wait for some time to receive 
offers. If it receives an offer, which proposes a primary coalition that is similar to one of it's 
preferred ones, the agent can decide to join. If the agent decides to lead forming a primary 
coalition, i.e., either being b0, s0 or l0, it has to make a decision about how many agents to be 
included in the coalition. Agents can use multiple templates for forming multiple primary 
coalitions. A buyer, for example, may want to buy multiple foods with other buyers, who are 
located in various places. Agents can also use multiple templates for forming a single primary 
coalition. An LP may want to form a primary coalition with other LPs such that each of them 
exclusively covers a certain area and all of them inclusively cover the whole area. 
 
4.3 Secondary Coalitions 
 
A secondary coalition is formed when a set of buyers agree to buy a set of foods from sellers 
and agree to have LPs deliver the foods for them. Any agent a0 who leads forming primary 
coalitions represents its members to negotiate with other agents. A leading buyer b0 of a 
primary coalition represents its members to negotiate on prices of the foods with a leading 
seller s0 as well as negotiate for delivery costs of the foods with a leading LP l0. The leading 
agents also have to negotiate with their coalition members for their final decisions. Agents 
who  are  not  satisfied  with  payoffs  they  might achieve  may  decide  to  deviate  from  their 
present primary coalitions and try to reform the new ones. 
 
4.3.1 Buyers to Sellers and LPs   
 
Before  a  leading  buyer  b0  negotiates,  it  collects  information  provided  by  its  coalition 
members in order to create a price request. It then negotiates with leading sellers and leading 
LPs as follows: 
1.  Agent b0 sends message B2S(id, b0, (f, q, t), p) to leading seller s0s, where t is the 
available time.   
 
2.  Any  leading  seller  s0  who  is  interested  then  counsels  with  its  coalition  members 
present capability. Agent s0 broadcasts the request to its members. 
 
3.  The member sellers evaluate their present capacities and reply with a message S2S(id, 
b, (f, q, t), p) bidding for the job. 
 
4.  The  leading  seller  may  have  to  negotiate  on  food,  quantity,  time  and  price  with 
member  sellers  with  message  S2S(id,  b,  (f,  q,  t),  p)  until  every  member  seller  is 
satisfied and the total quantity, available time and price is satisfied with the request. 
 
5.  The leading seller s0 accumulates the bids from its member sellers to create an offer. It 
then sends message S2B(id, s0, (f, q, v, t), p) back to b0. 
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6.  The  leading  buyer  then  can  manage  to  negotiate  for  delivery  with  LPs.  It  sends 
message B2L(id, b0, (f, q, v, t), (f0, q0, v0, t0), p), where (f, q, v, t) and (f0, q0, v0, t0) 
specifies job description for picking up from sellers and delivering the foods to buyers, 
to leading LPs. 
 
7.  Interested leading LP l0s broadcast the message to its primary coalition members.   
 
8.  Member LP l, who is interested, bids for the task by sending message L2L(id, (f, q, v, 
t), (f0, q0, v0, t0), p) to its leading LP l0. 
 
9.  The leading LP l0 accumulates all bids from its members in order to create a proposal 
for  the  distributing  job.  It  may  have  to  negotiate  over  quantity,  pickup  location, 
delivery location, pickup time, delivery time, and price with its members.   
 
10. Once it can create a reasonable proposal after reaching agreement with all members, it 
sends a message, i.e., proposal, (id, s0, (f, q, v, t), p) back to b0. 
 
11. The leading buyer b0 accumulates the proposals from the leading sellers and leading 
LPs and finds the best combination of a selling and an LP proposal. It then creates a 
proposal to its members and sends message (id, s0, (f, q, v, t), p) to the members. 
 
12. Members who are satisfied with the proposal send a message (id, s, ACK) to l0. 
 
13. Members who are not satisfied can negotiate over quantity, time and price by sending 
message (id, s, (f, q, v, t), p) back to the leading agent. 
 
14. Once all member buyers are satisfied, the leading buyer then sends message (id, b0, 
ACK) to the selected leading seller and LP. 
 
15. The leading buyer, seller, and LP send message (id, a0, CONFIRM) to their coalition 
members confirming that the secondary coalition has been formed.   
 
LPs are to pickup the foods from sellers and deliver to buyers. Sellers and LPs get paid when 
the foods are delivered. The negotiation within and among primary coalitions can keep going 
until agents are satisfied or the time is over. 
 
4.4 Decision Mechanism 
 
In our setting, each agent has their individual reserve price. For any buyer b, the reserve price 
rb is the maximum price he is willing to pay for acquiring a bunch of foods, i.e., including 
prices of foods and costs of delivery. For any seller s, the reserve price rs is the cost cp of 
producing foods plus the minimum profit it expects. For any LP l, the reserve price rl would 
be the estimated cost of operation plus the minimum profit it expects. Let B ⊂ B, S ⊂ S, and 
L ⊂ L be a set of buyers in a primary coalition, a set of sellers in a primary coalition, and a set 
of LPs in a primary coalition, respectively. For a secondary coalition C = {B, S, L}, the 
reserve price of B is 
  
 
the reserve price of S is 1116 
 
 
the reserve price of L is 
 
 
The coalition value of a secondary coalition C is 
 
          VC = rB – rS – rL, 
 
which is to be distributed among agents. Let PS be the price sellers charge buyers. Let PL be 
the price LPs charge buyers. The payoff for buyers in B is   
 
UB = rB – PS – PL. 
The payoff for sellers in S is 
 
US = PS – rS. 
 
The payoff for LPs in L is 
 
UL = PL – rL. 
 
The price each agent uses to negotiate may be higher than their reserve prices. There are 
several solution concepts in coalition formation theory (Kahan et al. 1984), e.g., core, kernel, 
etc. Knowing the bidding price of every agent in its primary coalition, the leading agent may 
try to find a fair division of their coalition payoff by using the Shapley value (Straffin 2002) 
concept. Agents in the primary coalition may find that the shares offered by the leading agent 
are below their won reserve price. Hence they may have to deviate from their present primary 
coalitions. 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
This paper proposes a model of agents-based coalitions in dynamic supply chains In our 
setting, agents take two steps: i) agents in each sector form loosely-coupled coalitions in 
order to decrease the complexity of the negotiation, and, ii) agents form coalitions across 
sectors in order to deliver foods to end customers. We propose a simple framework, which 
involves a negotiation protocol and a decision mechanism. The negotiation protocol allows 
thorough communication, i.e., buyers to buyers, buyers to sellers, sellers to sellers, buyer to 
LPs, and LPs to LPs. The decision mechanisms at this point are simple ones. They simply 
show  how  primary  and  secondary  coalitions  can  be  formed.  In  contrast  to  the  study  of 
coalition  formation  in  game  theory  that  only  pays  attention  to  the  analysis  of  stability, 
coalition formation in multi-agent system is concerned with algorithms of decision-making 
and negotiation of agents. Since one of the important issues in supply chains is to minimize 
logistics costs, we aim to find a mechanism that helps buyers to manage controlling logistics 
process rather than leaving it to sellers.   
 
We believe that with an efficient negotiation protocol and a decision making mechanism, the 
logistics costs can be reduced. The further step of our research is to concentrate on inventing 
such  a  protocol  and  evaluating  it.  We  also  have  to  consider  the  area  of  planning  under 1117 
uncertainty, e.g., the cost of travelling in heavy traffic, where the costs of logistics can hardly 
be estimated. To this end, approaches like Markov decision processes, Bayesian networks, 
CP-Nets, should be applicable. Furthermore, agents in such settings have to learn from the 
past  and  project  it  to  forecast  what  will  happen  in  the  future.  Efficient  utilization  of 
knowledge base helps agents perform better in dynamic coalition formation. We intend to 
implement a simulation based on this framework. We want to develop agents who are able to 
evolve strategies in order to enhance cooperation. We believe that the more agents cooperate, 
the better outcomes for agents in the long run. We want to explore how, under changing 
environment, agents can adapt their strategies and be successful at the end. 
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